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Japan’s Debate over Russia and the 
Ukraine Conflict 
A Review of Japanese Periodicals and Think Tank Publications in 2014 and 2015 
Leon Daiske Oberbäumer and Alexandra Sakaki 
German observers tend to view the causes and consequences of the Ukraine conflict 
in a Euro-Atlantic context. Their primary focus lies on Europe’s economic well-being 
and stability. The political discourse in Japan reveals a very different perception of the 
events. In Japan, Russia is viewed not primarily as a European power but rather as an 
Asian power. In their analysis of the causes and consequences of the conflict, Japanese 
experts consequently concentrate on the Asian context. Many of them call on Japan to 
intensify relations with Moscow – even if doing so means departing from the G7 line 
and Western sanctions policy. Japan’s interests, they argue, are best served by such a 
course of action. 
 
Before the Ukraine crisis, Japan under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
was set on achieving an historic break-
through in relations with Russia. In his first 
fourteen months of office, Abe met with 
the Russian president five times – more 
than with any other head of state or govern-
ment. Abe and Putin intended to negotiate 
a compromise to resolve the territorial dis-
pute over the four southern islands of the 
Kuril archipelago and finally – seven decades 
after the end of the war – to conclude a 
peace treaty. These plans have been put on 
ice as a result of the Ukraine crisis and 
the sanctions imposed on Russia by the G7 
nations. 
Since then, the Ukraine conflict and its 
effect on Japanese-Russian relations have 
been discussed in numerous political 
periodicals and think tank publications. 
Much of the analysis is focused on iden-
tifying the causes of the crisis. Japanese 
specialists place a much greater emphasis 
than their European colleagues on the 
Russian-Chinese relationship and the con-
flicting interests of the two nations in the 
post-Soviet space, above all in Central Asia 
and Ukraine. Second, many experts focus 
on the rapprochement between Russia and 
China that has taken place since the begin-
ning of the crisis and which springs pri-
marily from Russia’s weakness as a result 
of its international isolation. Opinions are 
divided on the extent to which this con-
vergence is likely to lead to a strong long-
term partnership. A third area of research 
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lies in extrapolating implications for 
Japanese policy. Many experts call for a 
change of strategy towards Moscow. They 
argue that Tokyo’s interests are better 
served by rapprochement with Russia than 
by the current ambivalent course, which 
consists of Japan joining in Western sanc-
tions while at the same time signaling to 
Russia its desire to maintain good relations. 
Calls by right-wing conservative groups 
in Japan for a military buildup, by contrast, 
represent but a minority opinion. Few 
Japanese researchers address the long-term 
effects of the Ukraine conflict on the inter-
national order. 
The Goals of Russia’s Course 
of Action 
Many German observers see the Ukraine 
conflict as a geopolitical power struggle 
between Russia and West. In their assess-
ment, the crisis is a manifestation of Russia’s 
efforts to bolster its political influence in 
the post-Soviet space and to put a stop to 
any further eastward expansion by the 
EU and NATO. But many Japanese experts 
consider such an interpretation one-sided. 
They see the geopolitical competition 
between Russia and China in Central Asia 
and the Ukraine as a second important 
motivation for Russia’s course of action. 
An essay by Tetsuji Tanaka in the con-
servative monthly Bungei Shunjū (circulation 
approx. 500,000) is representative of this 
view. Tanaka, who is the director of the 
Central Asia and Caucasus Research Insti-
tute in Tokyo, concedes that Russia and 
China have in fact cooperated in Central 
Asia in the past. The two countries have 
actively participated in the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization (SCO) in order to 
counter the growing influence of the US 
in Central Asia. Immediately following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union the two coun-
tries also came together in the framework 
of the Shanghai Five, the precursor to the 
SCO, in order to resolve regional border 
disputes. 
But Tanaka argues that in recent years, 
Sino-Russian relations have increasingly 
become tainted by strategic rivalry and 
distrust. The catalyst for this tension, he 
believes, is the Silk Road initiative, Beijing’s 
attempt to build an economic belt extend-
ing from Central Asia across the Middle 
East to Europe. According to Tanaka, Mos-
cow disapproves of the way China is em-
ploying massive investment to expand its 
political and economic influence to former 
Soviet republics. Tanaka bases his analysis 
primarily on statements made by various 
Ukrainian researchers. 
Tanaka observes that Moscow views 
China’s rapprochement with Ukraine with 
great suspicion, given that China has in-
creased its acquisition of military tech-
nology from former Soviet stockpiles in 
Ukraine. China made its first purchase 
in 1998, when it acquired an old aircraft 
carrier, which it subsequently modernized 
and equipped for its own navy despite 
promises to the contrary. According to 
Tanaka, China has also purchased icebreak-
ers and hovercraft and – it is rumored – 
even missile technology from Ukraine. It 
has also been active on the economic sphere. 
In 2008 China began promoting the ex-
pansion of an agricultural area in a region 
with defunct coal and iron ore factories – at 
first as an ecological project. Following the 
initial success, China expressed an interest 
in leasing the vast three-million-hectare 
area for no less than thirty years. In order 
to facilitate the transport of regional agri-
cultural products to China, explains Tanaka, 
Beijing is planning to build a large com-
mercial port on the Crimean Peninsula 
near Yevpatoria. This plan is alarming the 
Russian government, whose most impor-
tant naval port for its Black Sea fleet lies 
only 100 km away in Sevastopol. 
Tanaka sees the Ukraine conflict as a 
strategy by Moscow to thwart China’s plans 
and preserve Russia’s sphere of influence 
and power. Even after the annexation of 
Crimea, China is still interested building 
its Crimean port and leasing farmland in 
eastern Ukraine; but Russia is doing every-
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thing in its power to stop it. In Tanaka’s 
assessment, Russia’s ongoing support for 
the armed separatists in eastern Ukraine 
and for an independent “People’s Republic 
of Donetsk” are aimed at hindering China 
from carrying out its leasing plans. 
Shinji Hyōdō of the National Institute 
for Defense Studies (NIDS), a think tank 
attached to the Ministry of Defense, also 
sees the geopolitical competition with 
China as a key factor in Russia’s Ukraine 
policy. But he places more emphasis than 
Tanaka on the interplay with two other 
factors. First, Russia perceived the eastern 
expansion of NATO as a threat. For the loser 
of the Cold War, writes Hyōdō, it was hu-
miliating to witness the accession of former 
Soviet countries to the alliance. By annex-
ing Crimea, Putin prevented Ukraine from 
following suit. Hyōdō points out that Russia 
made use of the same tactic in the Georgia 
conflict: By recognizing the independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia ren-
dered Georgian accession to NATO impos-
sible. 
Second, Hyōdō focuses on the conse-
quences of waning US power. Washington’s 
decision not to intervene in the Syria con-
flict, argues Hyōdō, has made clear that 
the US is no longer able to play the role of 
“global policeman”. In view of this fact, the 
Kremlin has excluded the possibility of a 
US intervention in Ukraine. Hyōdō believes 
that the loss of US power also explains why 
Moscow has annexed a region in the cur-
rent crisis, whereas in the Georgia conflict 
it limited itself to recognizing regions as 
independent. Hyōdō reasons that all three 
factors – NATO’s eastward expansion, US 
weakness and China’s growing influence in 
Ukraine – have motivated Russia’s course 
of action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. 
Yoshiki Hidaka, visiting senior fellow 
at the Hudson Institute in the US and a 
journalist for the Japanese broadcasting 
company NHK, comes to a different con-
clusion. In an article published in the 
monthly magazine Seiron, which has a cir-
culation of approximately 80,000 and is 
directed primarily at the right-wing con-
servative camp, he points out that Russia 
has become an aggressive and strong mili-
tary power. Because the influence and the 
independence of the country depend pri-
marily on access to natural resources and 
safe export routes, he explains, Russia wants 
to use Crimea to export raw materials 
via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. 
Hidaka predicts that in the future Russia 
will devote more attention to expanding 
its Pacific fleet in Asia. Moscow has become 
increasingly interested in the natural re-
sources found in the Arctic and has ramped 
up is presence there. In Hidaka’s assessment, 
the sea route from the North Pole across 
the Bering Sea (bypassing Japan) is pivotal 
as it provides Russia with access to these 
resources. Hidaka considers it unlikely that 
Moscow will make concessions in the terri-
torial dispute over the Kuril Islands, which 
are under Russian administration. Hidaka’s 
assessment stands for the right-wing con-
servative camp, but not for majority opin-
ion in Japan. 
The Sino-Russian Relationship 
since the Beginning of the Crisis 
Japanese observers agree that Moscow is 
looking for new partners in Asia as a result 
of being economically and politically iso-
lated by the West. Consequently, the Rus-
sian-Chinese relationship has suddenly 
improved. The authors discussed here are 
in agreement that China has benefited 
from Russia’s weakness. For example, China 
has been able to negotiate favorable prices 
for Russian gas imports. But none of the 
Japanese experts believes that Moscow is 
content playing the role of junior partner 
to Bejing. Opinions vary on the prospects 
for Sino-Russian relations. 
Hiroyuki Tanaka, Moscow bureau chief 
of the daily newspaper Mainichi Shimbun, 
recapitulates the swift rapprochement 
between Russia and China since the begin-
ning of the Ukraine crisis in the liberal 
monthly magazine Mainichi Foramu. Tanaka 
believes the rapprochement is setting the 
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course for the coming years. In 2014 alone, 
he notes, President Putin and President Xi 
Jinping met five times. Numerous joint 
projects have been initiated, resulting in 
certain strategic interdependencies. As evi-
dence, Tanaka cites the gas agreement of 
May 2014, according to which Russia com-
mitted to provide China with gas for thirty 
years beginning in 2019 via a new pipeline. 
The author emphasizes that the bilateral 
cooperation is not limited to the energy sec-
tor. To support Russian enterprises, Chinese 
banks and investors have stepped in to com-
pensate for the lack of Western capital. 
Chinese firms are also involved in construc-
tion of a planned high-speed train connec-
tion between Moscow and Kazan, which lies 
800 km to the east. Supposedly Russia even 
wants to sell China its newest jet fighter, 
the Sukhoi-35. Though Beijing has not come 
out clearly for or against Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea, it is providing de facto sup-
port. Tanaka views Russia’s plans to involve 
Chinese companies in the construction of a 
bridge between the Russian mainland and 
Crimea as evidence of this support. Tanaka 
sees great potential for cooperation between 
the two countries in the coming years, even 
if Moscow wishes to avoid becoming overly 
dependent on Beijing and is looking for 
other foreign policy partners. 
The previously mentioned Tetsuji Tanaka 
is more skeptical when it comes to rap-
prochement tendencies. Tanaka ironically 
calls them a “honeymoon” resulting solely 
from Western sanctions and points out that 
the competitive relationship remains and 
will continue to impede close long-term 
cooperation. He also warns observers not to 
be deceived by Russia’s involvement in the 
New Development Bank BRICS (with head-
quarters in Shanghai) or by possible partici-
pation in the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB) initiated by Beijing. In 
fact, Moscow’s leading circles are deeply 
concerned about China’s growing claim 
to power in Central Asia. 
In an interview printed in the liberal 
monthly Sekai, Tomoaki Nishitani, director 
of the Toyota-financed Institute for Inter-
national Economic Studies, and Kazuhiko 
Tōgō, professor at Kyoto Sangyo University 
and former Japanese ambassador to the 
Netherlands, come to similar conclusions. 
Even if Russia has turned to China due to 
Western sanctions, they say, Moscow con-
tinues to harbor deep distrust towards its 
emerging neighbor. Russia therefore wants 
to avoid one-sided dependence on China 
at all costs. This is also evidenced by the 
planned route of the gas pipeline to China, 
which largely traverses Russian territory. 
This route allows Moscow to use the pipe-
line to deliver gas to other countries in the 
future. The two researchers believe that the 
Sino-Russian rivalry could have a negative 
effect on Japan if Russia expands its mili-
tary presence in the Kuril Islands in the 
coming years. A return of the islands to 
Japan would then become even less likely. 
Implications for Japan 
Nearly all the authors of the articles ana-
lyzed here call for a realignment of Japa-
nese policy towards Russia. The govern-
ment under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has 
thus far pursued a dual-track strategy. On 
the one hand, the government has joined 
the other G7 countries in condemning 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine. On the other 
hand, it has only half-heartedly imple-
mented the toothless sanctions imposed on 
Russia. This approach has enabled Tokyo to 
signal to Russia its desire to maintain good 
relations with Moscow, a message that 
Putin has understood. But most observers 
judge that this ambivalent policy does not 
sufficiently serve Japan’s interests. They 
urge Japan to pursue closer ties with Russia. 
Some authors justify this assessment by 
pointing out the advantages for Japan. They 
speculate that Russia, weakened as it is by 
Western sanctions, is likely to make con-
cessions in the dispute over the Kuril Islands; 
the timing is therefore propitious for nego-
tiations. This opinon is shared, for example, 
by the previously mentioned Kazuhiko Tōgō 
and by Mitsuhiro Kimura, head of the right-
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wing nationalist political group Issuikai. In 
an interview with the conservative monthly 
magazine Gekkan Nippon, they allege that 
Moscow has a great interest in maintaining 
good relations with Tokyo, since Russia is 
anxious to reduce its dependency on Beijing. 
Japan should therefore lift its economic 
sanctions against Russia and seek to estab-
lish closer economic, cultural and military 
cooperation. If Tokyo holds out the pros-
pect of technology transfer and bilateral 
energy trade, then Russia will open up to 
cooperation and dialogue. The authors 
argue that Japan should pursue an inde-
pendent foreign policy and not allow itself 
to be guided by other G7 countries. The 
previously mentioned Tomoaki Nishitani 
believes that pursuing such an active, in-
dependent policy can strengthen Japan’s 
role as a global actor and make it a worthy 
US partner. 
Other authors draw attention to the 
risks of continuing to pursue an ambivalent 
Russia policy. Taisuke Abiru, a research 
fellow at the influential private think tank 
Tokyo Foundation, outlines two of these 
risks in an article on the think tank’s web-
site. First, though Tokyo has endeavored to 
diversify its energy imports since the Fuku-
shima catastrophe, Abiru questions whether 
an intensified Japanese-Russian energy co-
operation will develop as envisioned. He 
points out that there have been signs that 
Russia is withdrawing from plans to build 
several liquid natural gas plants in eastern 
Siberia following the conclusion of the Rus-
sian-Chinese agreement on gas deliveries in 
May 2014. According to statements made 
by the CEO of Gazprom and his deputy in 
September and October 2014, the company 
is in the process of determining whether 
gas acquired in Siberia can be delivered 
exclusively to China. Such considerations 
reveal how weak Russia’s negotiating posi-
tion vis-à-vis China currently is. 
Second, Abiru fears the balance of power 
in Asia could be upset if Russia were to 
become more dependent on China. Forcing 
Moscow to play the role of junior partner to 
Beijing would simultaneously weaken those 
powers that currently counterbalance 
China’s growing regional and international 
influence. Given this state of affairs, Abiru 
recommends that Japan make clearer strides 
towards Russia, even if that means breaking 
ranks with the G7. Abiru points out that 
such a strategy also has its supporters in 
the US, citing as an example a Foreign Affairs 
article by Ely Ratner and Elizabeth Rosen-
berg from August 2014. The authors call on 
Washington to allow its Asian alliance part-
ners greater room for maneuver in their 
relations with Moscow in order to reduce 
Russia’s dependence on China. Abiru also 
notes that the first “search-and-rescue” 
training conducted by Russian and Japa-
nese naval units since the Ukraine crisis, 
which took place in October 2014, met with 
a positive response by Robert Thomas, Com-
mander of the US Seventh Fleet. In view of 
the lack of contacts between US and Russian 
naval forces, Thomas assessed the training 
as a particularly important point of contact 
with Russia. 
It is striking that most proponents 
underestimate the negative effect that a 
change of strategy towards Russia could 
have on the observance of internationally 
binding norms and rules. If Tokyo were to 
stop implementing sanctions, Beijing might 
conclude that breaches of international 
law, though temporarily condemned, are 
ultimately tolerated. Many Japanese govern-
ment officials thus fear that China could 
follow Russia’s example and occupy the 
Senkaku Islands (Chinese: Diaoyutai) in the 
East China Sea, which are currently under 
Japanese administration. 
Only a few of the authors discussed 
here draw attention to this possible conse-
quence. One of them is Shigeki Hakamada, 
professor at the University of Niigata Pre-
fecture. In an article in the magazine Gaikō, 
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
he advises Japan to maintain good reala-
tions with Russia but to also make clear 
that it is unacceptable to violate the sover-
eignty of Ukraine. If Japan does not position 
itself clearly vis-à-vis Russia, it can hardly 
expect the international community to sup-
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port it should China occupy the Senkaku 
Islands or even Okinawa Island, the main 
US military base in Japan. For Hakamada, 
Tokyo therefore has no choice but to con-
tinue pursuing its dual-track policy – a 
difficult diplomatic balancing act. 
Yoshiki Hidaka comes to exactly the 
opposite conclusion. In an article for the 
monthly magazine Voice, which like Seiron 
is directed at the right-wing conservative 
camp, he argues that Japan must arm itself, 
as it is facing two major powers that dis-
regard international law. Tokyo cannot rely 
solely upon its alliance partner, the US. 
Hidaka argues that it is unclear whether 
Washington would stand by Japan mili-
tarily in a conflict situation, for example 
over the Senkaku Islands. The domestically 
weakened Obama administration, Hidaka 
points out, lacks the financial resources 
to engage in another conflict. Thus, Japan 
needs to provide for its own protection. But 
Hidaka does not stipulate the extent to 
which he believes Japan should arm itself. 
Implications for the 
International Order 
The long-term effects of the Ukraine con-
flict on the international order receive little 
attention in the Japanese debate. None of 
the authors discussed here addresses how 
the crisis is affecting international disarma-
ment efforts, particularly the resultant loss 
of trust among negotiating partners. Also 
lacking are proposals for how to institute 
effective crisis management in the future. 
The consequences of the crisis for Europe’s 
security order are also neglected. 
When aspects of political order are dis-
cussed, Japanese experts concentrate pri-
marily on the question of whether this 
conflict has the potential to split the inter-
national community into two power blocs. 
Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki draws attention to 
this very danger. Yoshizaki, an economist 
at the Sojitz Research Institute, which is 
sponsored by the Japanese trading company 
Sojitz Corporation, argues in the conserva-
tive monthly magazine Chūō Kōron, that a 
split between the BRICS and the G7 coun-
tries and their allies is looming on the 
horizon. Yoshizaki points out that Russia 
has intensified its cooperation with the 
other BRICS partners since the beginning of 
the Ukraine crisis. At their summit meeting 
in July 2014, the BRICS countries agreed to 
establish their own New Development Bank 
as well as the Contingent Reserve Arrange-
ment, a monetary reserve fund – thus chal-
lenging the West and the established inter-
national financial institutions. Yoshizaki 
sees China and Russia, in particular, as 
working together in this area in order to 
defy the West. Nevertheless, he believes that 
the BRICS countries are destined to fail 
because they lack both political unity and 
economic stability. 
The already-mentioned Shigeki Haka-
mada dismisses as unrealistic the idea that 
blocs could be established similar to those 
formed during the Cold War. He concedes 
that the Russian president intends to form 
a Eurasian Economic Union of former 
Soviet republics as a counterweight to the 
EU and that Putin wants to add further 
Soviet successor nations to the current list 
of five members (Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Belarus). Due to the 
close ties between some of these countries 
and the EU, however, this plan is unlikely 
to come to fruition. In the end, Hakamada 
concludes that the mutual economic de-
pendencies in today’s globalized world run 
counter to the formation of such a bloc. 
Conclusion 
In light of the conflict over Ukraine, most 
Japanese experts agree that Russia is seek-
ing to secure its political influence in the 
post-Soviet space vis-à-vis the EU and NATO 
as well as an ever-stronger China. They 
believe Moscow is alarmed at Beijing’s in-
tention – which has become apparent in 
the past few years – to strengthen its ties 
with Ukraine and Central Asian countries. 
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The sudden improvement in Russian-
Chinese relations since the beginning of the 
Ukraine crisis despite geopolitical competi-
tion is attributed to Russia’s international 
isolation and the sanctions imposed on it. 
At the same time, there is some disagree-
ment as to whether the current improve-
ment has the potential to lead to close part-
nership. Due to the ongoing competition 
between the two sides, many researchers 
call this prospect into question. In their 
view, the rapprochement is not based on 
trust and conviction, but rather on Russia’s 
weakness alone. 
The advice Japanese experts are giving 
their own government provides German 
policymakers with food for thought. Japa-
nese researchers favor rapprochement with 
Moscow for several reasons. They suspect 
that due to its current weakness, Russia is 
willing to make concessions in order to 
gain international partners and overcome 
its isolation. This stance could facilitate an 
agreement in the Japanese-Russian terri-
torial dispute. Furthermore, by continuing 
its current Russia policy, Japan could ob-
struct its own plans to diversify its energy 
imports. As Russia is both a European power 
and an Asian power, the two regions inter-
act on many levels. Both Japan and Ger-
many, as well as Europe as a whole, would 
benefit from a better understanding of one 
another’s respective vantage points. Active 
exchange on the academic and political 
level would facilitate discussion regarding 
the aforementioned interaction and pro-
mote improved foreign policy coordination 
between the two sides. 
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